Battle of Tsushima

Battle of Tsushima
Part of the Russo-Japanese War
Admiral Tōgō on the bridge of Mikasa, at the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The signal flag being hoisted is the letter "Z", which was a special instruction to the Fleet.
Date 27–28 May 1905 Location Straits of Tsushima () Result Decisive Japanese victory
Belligerents
Imperial Japanese Navy	Imperial Russian Navy
Commanders and leaders
Heihachirō Tōgō Kamimura Hikonojō Dewa Shigetō	Zinovy Rozhestvensky (P.O.W.) Nikolai Nebogatov (P.O.W.) Oskar Enkvist
Strength
4 battleships 27 cruisers 21 destroyers 37 torpedo boats plus gunboats, and auxiliary vessels	8 battleships 3 coastal battleships 8 cruisers 9 destroyers
Casualties and losses
117 dead 583 injured 3 torpedo boats sunk	4,380 dead 5,917 captured 21 ships sunk (7 battleships) 7 captured 6 disarmed

The Battle of Tsushima (Japanese: 対馬海戦, tsushima-kaisen, Russian: Цусимское сражение, Tsusimskoye srazheniye), commonly known as the “Sea of Japan Naval Battle” (Japanese: 日本海海戦, nihonkai-kaisen) in Japan and the “Battle of Tsushima Strait”, was naval history's only decisive sea battle fought by modern steel battleship fleets. This was also the first naval battle in which wireless telegraphy played a critically important role. It was fought on May 27–28, 1905 (May 14–15 in the Julian calendar then in use in Russia) in the Tsushima Strait between Korea and southern Japan. In this battle the Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet, under Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, which had conducted a voyage of over 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to reach the Far East. Historian Edmund Morris calls it the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar.^[1]

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 152 mm (6-inch), 203 mm (8-inch), 254 mm (10-inch) and 305 mm (12-inch) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The battle demonstrated that big guns with longer ranges were more advantageous during naval battles than mixed batteries of different sizes.

The wireless was invented in the last half of the 1890s, and by the turn of the century all of the major navies were adopting this greatly improved means of communications. Although Alexander Stepanovich Popov of the Naval Warfare Institute had built and demonstrated a wireless telegraphy set in 1900, equipment from the firm Telefunken in Germany was initially adopted by the Imperial Russian Navy. In Japan, Professor Shunkichi Kimura was commissioned into the Imperial Navy to develop their own wireless system, and this was in place on many of the Japanese warships before 1904. Although both sides had early wireless telegraphy, the Russians were using "foreign" sets and had difficulties in their use and maintenance, while the Japanese had the advantage in using their own equipment. It is commonly recognized that this battle was the beginning of what today is called electronic warfare.^[2]

Prologue and overview

Conflict in the Far East

On 8 February 1904 destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Fleet anchored in Port Arthur; 3 ships—2 battleships and a cruiser—were damaged in the attack. The Russo-Japanese war had begun. Japan's first objective was to secure its sea lines of communication and supply to the Asian mainland thereby enabling it to conduct a ground war in Manchuria. To achieve this, it needed to neutralise Russian naval power in the East. At first, the Russian naval forces lay dormant and did not engage the Japanese, resulting in unopposed Japanese troop landings in Korea, but the Russians were revitalised by the arrival of Admiral Stepan Makarov and they were able to achieve some degree of success against the Japanese. However, Admiral Makarov's flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk struck a mine, which resulted in the death of the admiral, and Makarov's successors failed to challenge the Japanese Navy; as a consequence, the Russians were effectively bottled up in Port Arthur. By May, the Japanese had landed forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and in August began the siege of the naval station. On 9 August, Admiral Vitgeft, commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron, was ordered to sortie his fleet to Vladivostok,^[3] link up with the Squadron stationed there, and then engage the IJN in decisive battle.^[4] However, both squadrons of the Russian Pacific Fleet would ultimately become dispersed during the battles of the Yellow Sea and Ulsan on 10 & 14 August 1904 respectively. What remained of Russian naval power would eventually be sunk in Port Arthur.

The Second Pacific Squadron

With the inactivity of the First Pacific Squadron after the death of Makarov and the Japanese tightening the noose around Port Arthur, the Russians were considering sending part of their Baltic Fleet to the Far East. The Russian plan was to relieve Port Arthur by sea, link up with the First Pacific Squadron, overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy and then delay the Japanese advance into Manchuria until Russian reinforcements arrived via the Trans-Siberian railroad, thereby overwhelming Japanese land forces in Manchuria. With the situation in the Far East deteriorating, the Tsar (encouraged by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II), finally agreed to the formation of the Second Pacific Squadron which would consist of five divisions of the Baltic Fleet, including 11 of its 13 battleships. The squadron departed on 15 October 1904 under the command of Zinovy Rozhestvensky.

The Second Pacific Squadron sailed through the North Sea. With rumours of Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea, several Russian ships fired upon British fishing trawlers off Dogger Bank, leading to the Royal Navy shadowing the Russian fleet until a diplomatic agreement was reached. Barred from using the Suez Canal by the British, the Russians proceeded around Africa and by April/May 1905 had anchored at Cam Ranh Bay. The voyage was long and arduous, and the morale of the crews began to plummet. The Russians had been ordered to break the blockade of Port Arthur, but the town had already fallen on 2 January 1905 so the Russian port of Vladivostok would have to be the objective.

Tsushima Strait

Korea and Tsushima Straits and Tsushima Islands

The Russians could have sailed through one of three possible straits to reach Vladivostok: La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Admiral Rozhestvensky chose Tsushima in an effort to simplify his route. Admiral Tōgō, based at Pusan, Korea also believed Tsushima would be the preferred Russian course. The Tsushima Strait is the body of water eastwards of the Tsushima Island group located midway between the Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula, the shortest and most direct route from Indochina. The other two routes would have required the fleet to sail to the east of Japan. The Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, sent over from Europe, fought in the straits between Korea and Japan near the Tsushima Islands.

Opposing fleets

The Japanese fleets had practised gunnery regularly since the beginning of the war, using sub-calibre adapters for their cannon. The Japanese had superior gunners, and hit their targets more often. Furthermore, the Japanese used mostly high explosive shells with shimose (melinite), which was designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper structures of ships. The Russians used armour-piercing rounds with small guncotton bursting charges and unreliable fuses. Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships in proportion to Russian hits on Japanese ships, setting the superstructures, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire. (The Russian fleet had to often buy coal at sea from merchant vessels on most of their long voyage due to the lack of friendly fuelling ports on the journey). Japanese fire was also more accurate because they were using the latest issued (1903) Barr & Stroud FA3 coincidence rangefinder, which had a range of 6,000 yards, while the Russian battleships were equipped with Liuzhol rangefinders from the 1880s, which only had a range of about 4,000 yards.^[5] And finally, by 27 May 1905, Admiral Tōgō and his men had two battleship fleet actions under their belts, which amounted to over 4 hours of combat experience in battleship to battleship combat at Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea.^[6] An experience that would eliminate the miscalculations and rash decisions made during those battles, while applying the learned lessons from those sea engagements with both finesse & ruthlessness at Tsushima.^[7]

Due to the 18,000 mile journey, the Russian fleet was in poor shape for a naval battle. Apart from the four newest Borodino class battleships, Admiral Nebogatov's 3nd Division^[8] may have consisted of older designed and poorly-maintained warships; but over all neither side had any significant maneuverability over their opponents.^[9] However the long voyage, and the lack of opportunity for maintenance meant their bottoms were heavily fouled, which significantly reduced their general speed.^[10] The Japanese ships could reach 15 knots (28 km/h), but the Russian fleet could reach about 14 knots in short bursts^[11] (26 km/h). Tōgō was able to use the superior maneuverability of his fleet to advantage, "crossing the T" twice. Additionally, there were significant deficiencies in the Russian naval fleet's equipment and training. Russian naval tests with their torpedoes exposed major technological failings.^[12] On 27 May 1905, it wasn't the training, the battleships, nor the ammunition that were the determining factors of the battle; it was a combat-inexperienced battleship fleet Admiral in combat with another battleship fleet Admiral, who possessed over 4 hours of combat experience in battleships.^[13] This was experience that no other admiral in any navy possessed at that time, or any other time in history,^[14] with the possible exceptions of Russian Admirals Oskar Victorovich Stark and Wilgelm Vitgeft from the battles of Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea, but Stark was relieved of command, and Vitgeft was dead.

Battle

Naval tactics

Battleships, cruisers, and other vessels were arranged into divisions, each division being commanded by a Flag officer (i.e. Admiral). At the battle of Tsushima, Admiral Tōgō was the officer commanding in Mikasa (the other divisions being commanded by Vice Admirals, Rear Admirals, Commodores and Captains and Commanders for the destroyer divisions). Next in line after Mikasa came the battleships Shikishima, Fuji and Asahi. Following them were two armoured cruisers.

The battleship Mikasa, Admiral Tōgō's flagship at the battle of Tsushima, preserved as a memorial in Yokosuka, Japan.

When Admiral Tōgō decided to execute a turn to port in sequence, he did so in order to preserve the sequence of his battleline, i.e. with the flagship Mikasa still in the lead (which could point to that Admiral Tōgō wanted his more powerful units to enter action first). Turning in sequence meant that each ship would turn one after the other whilst still following the ship in front. Effectively each ship would turn over the same piece of sea (this being the danger in the maneuver as it gives the enemy fleet the opportunity to target that area). Tōgō could have ordered his ships to turn "together" i.e. each ship would have made the turn at the same time and reversed course. This manoeuvre, the same effected by the French-Spanish fleet in Trafalgar, would be quicker but would have disrupted the sequence of the battleline and caused confusion by altering the battle plans and placing the cruisers in the lead. This was something Tōgō wished to avoid.

First contact

Because the Russians desired to slip undetected into Vladivostok, as they approached Japanese waters they steered outside regular shipping channels to reduce the chance of detection. On the night of 26/27 May, the Russian fleet approached Tsushima Strait.

In the dark, misty night, a thick fog blanketed the straits, giving the Russians an advantage. At 2:45 AM, however, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru observed three lights on what appeared to be a vessel in the distant horizon and closed in to investigate. These were navigation lights onboard the hospital ship Oryol. At 4:30 AM, Shinano Maru approached the vessel, noting that the vessel contained no guns and appeared to be an auxiliary. The Oryol mistook the Shinano Maru for another Russian vessel and did not attempt to notify the fleet — instead, she signaled to inform the Japanese ship that there were other Russian vessels nearby. The Shinano Maru then sighted the shapes of ten other vessels in the mist. The Russian fleet had been discovered, and any chance of reaching Vladivostok undetected had disappeared.

Wireless telegraphy played an important role from the start. At 4:55am, Captain Narukawa of the Shinano Maru sent a wireless message to Admiral Tōgō in Masampo that "Enemy is in square 203". By 5 AM, intercepted wireless signals informed the Russians that they had been discovered and that Japanese scouting cruisers were shadowing them. Admiral Tōgō received his message at 5:05 AM, and immediately began to prepare his battle fleet for a sortie.

Beginning of the battle

At 6.34 AM, before departing with the Combined Fleet, Admiral Tōgō wired a confident message to the navy minister in Tokyo:

At the same time the entire Japanese fleet put to sea, with Admiral Tōgō from his flagship Mikasa leading over forty vessels to meet the Russians. Meanwhile, the shadowing Japanese scouting vessels sent wireless reports every few minutes as to the formation and course of the Russian fleet. There was still mist which reduced visibility and the weather was poor. Wireless gave the Japanese an advantage; in his report on the battle, Admiral Tōgō noted the following:

At around 1:40 PM, both fleets sighted each other and prepared to engage each other. Also at 1:55 PM, Admiral Tōgō ordered the hoisting of the Z flag:

At 2:45 PM, Tōgō crossed the Russian 'T' enabling him to fire broadsides, while the Russians could only reply with their forward turrets."^[18][19]

Daylight battle

Map showing the routes of both fleets

The Russians sailed from south-southwest to north-northeast; the Japanese fleet from west to northeast. Admiral Tōgō ordered the fleet to turn in sequence, which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians, though risking each battleship in turn. This U-turn was successful. At 14:08, the Japanese flagship Mikasa was hit at about 7,000 metres, with the Japanese replying at 6,400 metres. Superior Japanese gunnery then took its toll^[20] with most of the Russian battleships being crippled. As naval engagements traditionally began at a considerably closer range, Tōgō immediately gained the advantage of surprise.

Russian officer, Commander Vladimir Semenoff aboard the flagship Suvorov, noted that "It seemed impossible even to count the number of projectiles striking us. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper decks were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their mountings. In addition to this, there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst."^[19]

A direct hit on the Borodino's magazines by the Japanese battleship Fuji caused her to explode which sent smoke thousands of feet into the air and trapped all of her crew onboard as the Borodino slid into the sea.^[19] The Japanese ships suffered only light damage. Admiral Rozhestvensky was knocked out of action by a shell fragment in his skull. In the evening, Rear Admiral Nebogatov took over command of the Russian fleet. The Russians lost the battleships Knyaz Suvorov, Oslyabya, Imperator Aleksander III and Borodino on 27 May.

Night attacks

At night, around 8 PM, 37 Japanese torpedo boats and 21 destroyers were thrown against the Russians. The destroyers attacked from the vanguard while the torpedo boats from the east and south of the Russian fleet. The Japanese were aggressive, continuing their attacks for three hours without intermission, and as a result during the night there were a number of collisions between the small craft and Russian warships. The Russians were now dispersed in small groups trying to break northwards. By 11 PM, it appeared that the Russians had vanished, but they revealed their positions to their pursuers by turning on their searchlights — ironically, the searchlights had been turned on to spot the attackers. The old battleship Navarin struck a mine and was compelled to stop, and consequently she was torpedoed four times and sunk. Of a crew of 622, only three survived to be rescued by the Japanese.

The battleship Sisoy Veliki was heavily damaged by a torpedo in the stern, and was scuttled the next day. Two old armoured cruisers — Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh — were heavily damaged: the former by a torpedo hit to the bow, and the latter by colliding with a Japanese destroyer. They were both scuttled by their crews the next morning, the Admiral Nakhimoff off Tsushima Island where she headed while taking on water. The night attacks had put great strain on the Russians, as they had lost two battleships and two armoured cruisers, while the Japanese only lost three torpedo boats.

XGE signal and Russian surrender

During the night action, Admiral Tōgō was able to rest his main fleet of armoured ships. At 9:30 AM, what remained of the Russian fleet was sighted heading northwards. Admiral Tōgō's battleships proceeded to surround Nebogatov's remaining squadron south of the island of Takeshima.^[19] At 10:34 AM, realising that his situation was hopeless, Admiral Nebogatov ordered the six ships remaining under his command to surrender. XGE, an international signal of surrender, was hoisted up; it was only at 10:53 AM that the Japanese agreed to the surrender. Realising that the battle had become futile, Nebogatov was unwilling to sacrifice the young lives of his sailors to save his own honour.^[19] The old Russian admiral decided instead to accept the shame of surrender even in the knowledge that he might be shot when he returned to Russia.^[19] He said to his men

As for Rozhestvensky, he was imprisoned in a Japanese hospital. The victorious Admiral Tōgō would later visit him here where Tōgō comforted the wounded Rozhestvensky with these sage words.

In the event, neither Nebogatov nor Rozhestvensky were shot when they returned to Russia. However, both men were placed on trial and imprisoned for a few years before they were eventually pardoned by the Tsar. Their reputations, however, lay in tatters.

Until the evening of 28 May, single Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese until they were destroyed or captured. Three Russian ships reached Vladivostok; the cruiser Izumrud, which escaped from the Japanese despite Nebogatov's surrender, was scuttled by the Russians themselves after running aground near the Siberian coast. Some ships returned to Russia or were interned.

Aftermath

Battle damage to cruiser Zemtchug. Note shell hole in stack

Battle damage to cruiser Oleg, in Manila bay

Russian losses

It was a devastating loss for Russia, which lost all of its battleships, most of its cruisers and destroyers, and effectively ended the Russo-Japanese war in Japan's favor. The Russians suffered 4,380 killed and 5,917 captured, including 2 admirals and 1,862 interned.^[21]

Battleships

The Russians lost all 8 of their battleships and all 3 of the smaller coastal battleships in the battle, either being sunk or captured by the Japanese, or scuttled to prevent capture. Four ships were lost to enemy action during the daylight battle on 27 May: Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksander III, Borodino and the Oslyabya. The Navarin was lost during the night action, on 27–28 May, while the Sissoi Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Ushakov were either scuttled or sunk the next day. Four other battleships under Rear Admiral Nebogatov were forced to surrender and would end up as prizes of war. This group consisted of only one modern battleship, Oryol, along with the old battleship Imperator Nikolai I and the two small coastal battleships General-Admiral Graf Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin. The small coastal battleship Admiral Ushakov refused to surrender and was scuttled by her crew.

Cruisers

The Russians lost 4 of their 8 cruisers in the battle, had 3 interned by the Americans, with the last one escaping to Vladivostok. The Vladimir Monomakh and Svyetlana were sunk the next day, after the daylight battle. The cruiser Dmitri Donskoy fought against six Japanese cruisers and survived; however due to heavy damage she was scuttled. The Izumrud ran aground near the Siberian coast. Three Russian protected cruisers, Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg escaped to the US naval base at Manila and were interned. The armed yacht classified as a cruiser, Almaz was able to reach Vladivostok.

Destroyers and Auxiliaries

The Russians lost 6 of their 9 destroyers in the battle, had 1 interned by the Chinese, with the last 2 escaping to Vladivostok. Five destroyers the Buiny, Buistry, Bezupreshchny, Gromky and Blestyashchy were sunk on 28 May, the Byedovy also surrendered that day. Bodry was interned in Shanghai. Two destroyers the Grosny and Bravy reached Vladivostok.

Of the auxiliaries, the Kamchatka, Ural and Rus were sunk on 27 May, Irtuish ran aground on 28 May, Koreya and Svir were interned in Shanghai and the Anadyr escaped to Madagascar. The hospital ships Oryol and Kostroma were captured with the Kostroma released afterwards.

Japanese losses

The Japanese lost only three torpedo boats (Nos. 34, 35 and 69), 117 killed and 500 wounded.^[21]

Political consequences

Russia's prestige in the eyes of the world was badly damaged and it was a severe blow to the Romanov dynasty. Nearly the entire Russian fleet was lost in the battle in the Tsushima Straits; the fast armed yacht Almaz (classified as a cruiser of the 2nd rank) and two destroyers (Grozny and Bravy) were the only Russian ships to make it through to Vladivostok. Darrell Zemitis has argued that the political humiliation of the loss of this war was a direct contribution to the 1905 Revolution in Russia.^[22] In The Guns of August historian Barbara Tuchman argues that Russia's loss destabilized the balance of power in Europe, emboldening the Central Powers and contributing to their decision to go to war in 1914.

The battle had a profound cultural and political impact upon Japan. It was the first defeat of a Western (European) power by an Eastern (Asian) nation,^[23] utilising the full breadth of industrial technology, in modern times. It also destroyed the myth of white superiority, widely accepted in Western society at the time.^[24] The victory established Japan as the sixth greatest naval power^[25] while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger than that of Austria Hungary.^[25]

The victory helped embolden Japan's increasingly aggressive political and military establishment. However, the lopsided Japanese victory at Tsushima also:

"created a legend that was to haunt Japan's leaders for forty years. A British admiral once said, 'It takes three years to build a ship, but 300 years to build a tradition.' Japan thought that the victory had completed this task in a matter of a few years...It had all been too easy. Looking at Tōgō's victory over one of the world's great powers convinced some Japanese military men that with more ships, and bigger and better ones, similar victories could be won throughout the Pacific. Perhaps no power could resist the Japanese navy, not even Britain and the United States?"^[21]

As Geoffrey Regan notes, Tsushima was decisive:

"because the result was so misleading. Certainly the Japanese navy had performed well, but its opponents had been weak, and it was not invincible....Tōgō's victory [helped] set Japan on a path that would eventually lead her" to the Second World War.^[21]

The Dreadnought arms race

The Japanese victory at Tsushima seemed to confirm the strategic importance of a naval fleet based on modern battleships, and in October 1905 the UK government authorized the laying of the keel for HMS Dreadnought, which upon her launching in 1906 stimulated the dreadnought naval arms race between Britain and Germany in the years before 1914. In the event, the British and German fleets met in only one major action, the indecisive Battle of Jutland.^[26]

Time line

27 May 1905 (JST)

• 04:45 The Shinano Maru (Japan) locates the Russian Baltic Fleet and sends a wireless signal.
• 05:05 The Japanese Combined Fleet leaves port and sends a wireless signal to Imperial Headquarters: "Today's weather is fine but waves are high. (Japanese: 本日天気晴朗なれども波高し)".
• 13:39 The Japanese Combined Fleet gains visual contact with the Russian Baltic Fleet, and sends up the battle flag.
• 13:55 Distance (Range): 12,000 meters. The Mikasa sends up Z flag. (Z flag's meaning: The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.).
• 14:05 Distance (Range): 8,000 meters. The Japanese Combined Fleet turns to helm aport (i.e. start U-turn).
• 14:07 Distance (Range): 7,000 meters. The Mikasa completes its turn. The Russian Baltic Fleet opens fire with their main batteries.
• 14:10 Distance (Range): 6,400 meters. All Japanese warships complete their turns.
• 14:12 Distance (Range): 5,500 meters. The Mikasa receives her first hit from the Russian guns.
• 14:16 Distance (Range): 4,600 meters. The Japanese Combined Fleet begins concentrating their return fire on the Russian flagship, the Knyaz Suvorov
• 14:43 The Oslyabya and Knyaz Suvorov are set ablaze and fall away from the battle line.
• 14:50 The Emperor Alexander III starts turning to the north and attempts to leave the battle line.
• 15:10 The Oslyabya is sunk, and the Knyaz Suvorov attempts to withdraw.
• 18:00 The two fleets counter attack each other (distance (range): 6,300 m), and begin exchanging main battery fire again.
• 19:03 The Emperor Alexander III is sunk.
• 19:20 The Knyaz Suvorov, Borodino, and Sisoy Veliki are sunk.

28 May 1905 (JST)

• 09:30 The Japanese Combined Fleet locates the Russian Baltic Fleet again.
• 10:34 The Russian commander signals "XGE", which is "I surrender" in the International Code of Signals used at the time.
• 10:53 Admiral Tōgō accepts the surrender.

See also

• Naval history of Japan
• Nicholas II of Russia

Notes

References

Further reading

External links

• 1969 Film Battle of the Japan Sea—directed by Seiji Maruyama
  • Part 1—Film Battle of the Japan Sea
  • Part 2—Film Battle of the Japan Sea
• History.com— This Day In History: The Battle of Tsushima Strait
• Battlefleet 1900—Free naval wargame rules covering the pre-dreadnought era, including the Russo-Japanese War.
• Russojapanesewar.com—Contains a complete order of battle of both fleets. It also contains Admiral Tōgō's post-battle report and the account of Russian ensign Sememov.